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ZONING AND MARKET EXTERNALITIES 
Amnon Lehavi* 
ABSTRACT 
The centennial of the 1916 New York City Ordinance and creation of 
zoning in the United States provides an exceptional opportunity to 
reconsider the regulatory and legal basis upon which the key governmental 
power of zoning is founded.  The motive to control the various market 
externalities embedded in land use regulation, from effects on commercial 
activity to housing prices and job-related housing needs, has practically 
guided local governments from the very first days of zoning.  Yet, at the same 
time, such considerations of market externalities remain in the shadows of 
explicit zoning law and policy, as the discussion is re-routed to the allegedly 
more stable foundations of zoning, such as control of environmental, fiscal, 
or social externalities. 
This Article is the first to specifically explore the legitimacy of local 
governments regulating private economic activities that have an aggregate 
effect on the real estate market—defined here as “market externalities.”  
May a local government limit the scope of new commercial uses, such as 
shopping malls, if it believes that there is already an excess supply of them; 
or constrain the entry of big-box retailers to preserve the economic viability 
of existing retailers in a downtown business district?  Can a land use 
ordinance limit, or entirely prohibit, the renting out of housing units in a 
certain neighborhood, to keep out investors who might drive up real estate 
prices?  Is government entitled to require a developer of market-rate 
properties to pay a mitigation fee to finance affordable housing units—under 
a theory that the project would generate new demand for local services 
provided by modest-income workers who are in need of housing solutions? 
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This Article develops an innovative theory of zoning and market 
externalities.  It argues that zoning power should extend to regulate market 
externalities—provided that such decisions are based on a general land use 
policy that can be clearly identified and are not tailored to intentionally 
block, or legitimize, specific projects. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Introduction ...................................................................................... 362 
I.  Externalities and Theories of Zoning ........................................... 365 
A.  The Zoning Power .......................................................... 365 
B.  Technological or Environmental Externalities ............... 370 
C.  Fiscal Externalities ......................................................... 373 
D.  Social Externalities ......................................................... 376 
E.  Pecuniary and Market Externalities ................................ 380 
II.  The Regulation of Market Externalities ...................................... 384 
A.  Entry of Commercial Uses ............................................. 384 
B.  Renting Out Investment Property ................................... 389 
C.  Inclusionary Zoning and Market Nexus ......................... 393 
III.  Judicial Review of Market-Based Zoning ................................. 399 
A.  Consistency with Overall Land Use Policy .................... 399 
B.  Intergovernmental Market Externalities ......................... 404 
Conclusion ........................................................................................ 409 
INTRODUCTION 
The New York Times recently portrayed the growing economic distress of 
many enclosed shopping malls across the United States.1  The potential 
reasons for this hardship are numerous, and not all malls share the same fate.  
While high-end “A-rated” malls are performing well, middle- and working-
class malls are seeing increasing vacancy rates.  The fundamental problem 
of the latter malls is arguably one of over-abundance, the result of a “long 
boom in building retail space of all kinds.”2  Moreover, once such a massive 
space becomes vacant or entirely “dead,” its resurrection might prove a 
daunting task.3 
This turn of events may reinvigorate a long-standing debate about the 
proper role of government in the real estate market.  The current downturn 
                                                                                                                                      
 1. Nelson D. Schwartz, The Economics (and Nostalgia) of Dead Malls, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
3, 2015, at A1. 
 2. Id. 
 3. See Sarah Schindler, The Future of Abandoned Big Box Stores:  Legal Solutions to 
the Legacies of Poor Planning Decisions, 83 U. COLO. L. REV. 471, 474 (2012) (describing 
lingering problems of blight, symbolic decline, and economic harm to the surrounding 
community resulting from largely vacant or entirely abandoned big-box retail stores and 
suggesting various strategies to revitalize such derelict spaces). 
2017] ZONING & MARKET EXTERNALITIES 363 
of multiple shopping malls could be seen as a sign of healthy competition 
among retailers and an inevitable result of changing consumer preferences.  
Alternatively, however, this decline might be an indication of some kind of 
market- or government-failure.  If the latter proposition is embraced, 
government might legitimately avoid this failure by intervening early and 
explicitly considering, within its land use regulation powers, the potential 
effect of excess demand or other pecuniary impacts that a planned project 
might entail. 
As this Article shows, the economic effect of real estate developments is 
a matter of crucial importance for private and public stakeholders, and such 
considerations play a key role in land use decisions.  The issue of pecuniary 
externalities and other types of economic activities that have an aggregate 
effect on the real estate market—defined here as “market externalities”—
may even be seen as going back to the days of establishing the institution of 
zoning in the United States.4 
However, the jurisprudence on the legitimacy of the government 
explicitly addressing market externalities and on the standard of review that 
should apply has been sporadic.5  In many cases, both policymakers and 
courts avoid these questions by rerouting the analysis to the allegedly more 
stable foundations of the zoning power, such as regulation of environmental 
externalities caused by conflicting land uses, or fiscal externalities that 
address developments’ impact on public infrastructure.6 
Therefore, while economists have long addressed the welfare and 
distributive effects of pecuniary externalities and have applied such insights 
to the spatial-urban context, the legal profession has done neither.7  This 
Article sets out to close this gap by developing a legal framework for zoning 
and market externalities. 
This Article asserts that the power of zoning and other types of land use 
regulation should extend explicitly to regulate market externalities.  
Regulatory decisions addressing pecuniary externalities should be 
considered legitimate when such regulation establishes a general land use 
policy and is not tailored to intentionally block or legitimize a specific 
project.  Every zoning decision must obviously account also for the specific 
features of the project and the cost/benefit analysis it entails, and government 
should be entitled to deviate from its general policy under extraordinary 
                                                                                                                                      
 4. See infra Section I.E. 
 5. See infra Part II. 
 6. See infra Sections I.B and I.C. 
 7. The legal literature on the matter focuses mostly on the boundaries of limiting 
competition but hardly addresses pecuniary externalities more systematically. See, e.g., 
ROBERT C. ELLICKSON ET AL., LAND USE CONTROLS:  CASES AND MATERIALS 112-21 (4th ed. 
2013). 
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circumstances.  At the same time, judicial review should examine the 
government’s ability to explicitly anchor its individual decisions within a 
broader land use policy. 
Although the dilemma of specific versus general decision making is 
present for the more established justifications for zoning power, this tradeoff 
is of particular importance in the context of regulating market externalities.8  
Accordingly, courts should defer to governments by lowering their standard 
of review only for actions made within a broader decision making 
framework—not actions made outside of it. 
Moreover, a local government’s zoning decision that regulates potential 
market externalities may generate other types of market externalities, 
positive or negative, across municipal borders.  Judicial review of such 
zoning decisions should also hold the local government accountable for the 
potential threat of “regulatory opportunism,” in which a certain municipality 
simply seeks to shoulder a specific negative market externality on the 
residents of adjacent localities.9  The legal criteria for holding a municipality 
responsible for an inter-local market externality, generated by its zoning 
decision, should be based chiefly on the consistency of this effect with the 
broad-based policy adopted by the municipality to regulate its own intra-
local externalities. 
The Article is structured as follows.  Part I starts by concisely portraying 
the power of zoning, and land use regulation in general, as it has emerged 
over the past century.  It discusses the gradual, often implicit expansion of 
zoning’s legitimate goals as identified by courts and the corresponding 
standards of judicial review applied to such measures.  This Part analyzes 
the different treatment of technological and environmental externalities, 
fiscal externalities, and “social externalities” versus the treatment of market 
externalities.  While the former types of effects are viewed as operating 
‘outside the market’ and, thus, liable to generate welfare inefficiencies, 
economists have tended to view market externalities as operating ‘within the 
market’ by solely affecting prices, thus producing no inefficiencies.10  From 
a legal perspective, however, pecuniary or market externalities, whether 
positive or negative, receive almost no explicit attention and remain in the 
shadows of zoning law.11 
                                                                                                                                      
 8. See Eric Biber & J.B. Ruhl, The Permit Power Revisited:  The Theory and Practice 
of Regulatory Permits in the Administrative State, 64 DUKE L. J. 133, 155-64 (2014) 
(delineating types of regulatory permits, from specific to general, and describing how these 
various options play out in the context of land use regulation). 
 9. See Amnon Lehavi, Intergovernmental Liability Rules, 92 V.A. L. REV. 929, 940-48 
(2006) (discussing the concept of inter-local zoning externalities and the potential motives for 
it). 
 10. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 43-45 (5th ed. 2007). 
 11. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
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Part II explores, in detail, market externalities.  It discusses three different 
settings.  First, this Part asks whether government can limit the scope of new 
commercial uses, such as shopping malls or big box retailers, if the city 
believes that there is already excess supply of commerce or if the city 
otherwise wishes to preserve the viability of its Central Business District 
(“CBD”).12  Second, it examines various limits imposed on renting out 
housing units in a certain jurisdiction, or parts thereof, in order to keep out 
investors who might drive up real estate prices.  Third, it asks whether a local 
government is entitled to require a developer of market-rate properties to pay 
a mitigation fee to finance affordable housing units—under the theory that 
the project would generate demand for services, which would be provided 
by low- and modest-income workers in need of housing. 
Part III outlines the standards of judicial review that should apply to such 
cases.  It argues that land use decisions that regulate potential market 
externalities should be granted a high degree of deference, as falling within 
government’s police power, if the regulation is anchored in a general policy 
that deals with the relevant features of the real estate market.  The 
municipality would thus have to establish a “substantial relation”13 between 
its broad policy on market activities and measures taken to control adverse 
market externalities.  At the same time, such a local policy should be held 
accountable for potential market externalities that this strategy may generate 
for neighboring localities.  This is required in order to prevent opportunism 
among local governments in regulating market externalities. 
I.  EXTERNALITIES AND THEORIES OF ZONING 
A. The Zoning Power 
Zoning was introduced in the United States—and quickly became 
established—during the first three decades of the twentieth century.  
Historical accounts of zoning regularly identify three key milestones in its 
early regulatory and legal development.14 
Historians consider the 1916 New York City Ordinance (“NYC 
Ordinance”) to be the first comprehensive scheme to divide an entire 
municipality into zones, in which permitted land uses, building volumes, 
height restrictions, and other details were regulated.15  The second stage was 
                                                                                                                                      
 12. For the concept of a central business district as the commercial and financial hub of a 
certain city, see BRENDAN O’FLAHERTY, CITY ECONOMICS 126-27 (2005). 
 13. This standard of judicial review was set by the Supreme Court in the seminal case of 
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926), discussed in infra notes 
19-21 and accompanying text. 
 14. See, e.g., O’FLAHERTY, supra note 12, at 170-74. 
 15. It should be noted that prior to this ordinance, a number of American cities adopted 
limited-purpose controls on construction, driven mostly by safety concerns, thus resembling 
building and fire codes. See ELLICKSON ET AL., supra note 7, at 57-58. 
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the nearly uniform adoption of the 1926 Standard State Zoning Enabling Act 
(“SZEA”)16 and the 1928 Standard City Planning Enabling Act 
(“SCPEA”),17 through which states granted localities the power to regulate 
land use.18  The third prong was the 1926 U.S. Supreme Court decision in 
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,19 in which the Court validated zoning 
as falling within government’s police power.20  The Court held that the 
exercise of the zoning power is constitutionally valid, unless such provisions 
“are clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the 
public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.”21 
Over the following decades, federal and state courts generally tended to 
frame the policy purposes and consequent legal contours of the zoning power 
as falling within the scope of health, safety, morals, and general welfare, with 
the latter, broad term allowing courts to give local governments significant 
leeway in exercising their zoning power.22  While courts have examined 
whether a particular zoning scheme meets the “substantial relation” test and 
have otherwise developed a thick body of law on the potential application of 
the Takings Clause to the regulation of land use,23 they have generally 
refrained from an elaborate analysis of the underlying goals of zoning.24 
When federal and state courts have agreed to dig into the proper purposes 
of zoning, they have framed the analysis within zoning’s more stable 
foundations, which include “technological” or environmental externalities.25  
This framing has also allowed courts to analyze certain types of legitimate—
or illegitimate—forms of social planning by tying such “social externalities” 
to questions, for example, of incompatible uses or density control.26  Courts 
also address the control of “fiscal externalities.”27  In contrast, judges have 
                                                                                                                                      
 16. Advisory Comm. on Zoning, U.S. DEP’T OF COM., A Standard State Zoning Enabling 
Act (1926 rev’d ed.). 
 17. Advisory Comm. on City Planning and Zoning, U.S. DEP’T OF COM., A Standard City 
Planning Enabling Act (1928). 
 18. Over the years, several states amended their enabling statutes, and some aspects of 
zoning are also regulated by state-level and federal legislation.  However, the overall focus of 
zoning on local government power remains intact. See Lehavi, supra note 9, at 935-37. 
 19. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
 20. Id. at 389-90. 
 21. Id. at 389-90, 395. 
 22. ELLICKSON ET AL., supra note 7, at 114-15. 
 23. For a survey of the case law on the types of land use regulation that may amount to 
an uncompensated taking in-effect of private property contrary to the Fifth Amendment, see 
id. at 134-87. 
 24. WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, ZONING RULES:  THE ECONOMICS OF LAND USE REGULATION §§ 
3.12-3.25 (2015). 
 25. See infra Section I.B. 
 26. See infra Section I.B. 
 27. See infra Section I.C. 
2017] ZONING & MARKET EXTERNALITIES 367 
rarely explicitly addressed the nature of underlying goals relating to 
“pecuniary externalities” or “market externalities.”28 
The NYC Ordinance29 demonstrates how the promotion of zoning’s four 
goals might actually affect the motivation for zoning and the ways in which 
some pronounced goals might take over the overt discourse. 
The chief proponents of the measure were members of the real estate 
industry and business owners in the city who were “anxious to put an end to 
the damages wrought by uncontrolled development.”30  They were joined in 
their efforts by planning advocates, professional reformers, and public 
officials, who had different agendas.31  Thus, for example, progressives and 
reformers viewed zoning as a means to limit “untrammeled capitalism” and 
to make the city more beautiful and livable.32  The underlying views on the 
desirable nature of the market were far from uniform. 
In breaking down the specific concerns that drove the promulgation of the 
NYC Ordinance, one can identify all the motives for zoning, namely: 
limiting technological or environmental externalities, fiscal externalities, 
market externalities, and promoting social planning.  First, owners of 
downtown office buildings increasingly lost their access to sunlight and air 
to new skyscrapers, thus decreasing their rental value.33  This loss of sunlight 
had a dramatic impact, because, up until the 1940s, sunlight was the principal 
source of illumination for interiors.34  The scope of such externalities was 
considerable: the forty-story Equitable Building, completed in 1915, cast a 
shadow over four high-value blocks.35  To control this externality, the NYC 
Ordinance imposed height limits and setback requirements.36  As Section I.B 
shows, responses to these and other technological or environmental 
externalities became the mainstay of zoning concerning both land uses and 
building restrictions. 
A second type of concern that drove the New York City regulation 
demonstrates how technological or environmental issues can become 
meshed with “social externalities.”  Owners and operators of high-end retail 
stores along Fifth Avenue were concerned about the entry of manufacturing 
                                                                                                                                      
 28. See infra Section I.D. 
 29. See Zoning Background, N.Y.C. PLAN., http://www1.nyc.gov/site/planning/zoning/
background.page [https://perma.cc/UGS6-F5SN]. 
 30. Raphaël Fischler, The Metropolitan Dimension of Early Zoning:  Revisiting the 1916 
New York City Ordinance, 64(2) J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 170, 170 (1998). 
 31. Id. at 171. 
 32. O’FLAHERTY, supra note 12, at 171-72. 
 33. Fischler, supra note 30, at 172-73. 
 34. See CAROL WILLIS, FORM FOLLOWS FINANCE:  SKYSCRAPERS AND SKYLINES IN NEW 
YORK AND CHICAGO 24-26 (1995). 
 35. O’FLAHERTY, supra note 12, at 172. 
 36. Id. at 173. 
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lofts, which employed many poor immigrant women.37  Their fear was that 
the mass presence of working-class women on the streets would deter the 
stores’ wealthy clientele and undermine the area’s appeal.  Framed, however, 
as a problem of incompatible uses, the city was divided into three types of 
use districts: one reserved solely for housing, another open to commerce, and 
a third allowing industry.38  Indirect social planning was, thus, promoted 
through zoning. 
A third problem involved fiscal externalities, namely the growing pressure 
that the rapid private development of real estate placed on the city’s public 
infrastructure.  Both in the financial district and on Fifth Avenue, 
development caused acute street congestion.39  Human congestion also posed 
health threats in both tenement areas and office buildings.  Moreover, the 
congestion issue coincided with the city’s effort to unite the five boroughs 
by an integrated public transit system.40  Placing limits on building volumes 
was therefore intended to serve the broader goal of dispersing the population 
into outer areas, which would, in turn, facilitate the inter-borough layout of 
the public transit system.41 
Further, the constant movement of different populations and activities 
made it difficult for school authorities to allocate children to particular 
schools.  The mix of land uses also increased the costs of policing, fire-
fighting, street maintenance, and postal delivery.42  The division of the city 
into use-districts and limits on building volumes were, thus, essential to 
provide more permanent structure to the city’s neighborhoods and allow for 
a well-functioning infrastructure. As Section I.C shows, fiscal zoning has 
since become an explicit regulatory principle. 
Finally, market externalities were at play as a motivating force for the 
NYC Ordinance, although their role has been formally overshadowed by the 
other considerations mentioned above.  In 1916, the New York office market 
went through a period of high vacancy rates, exacerbated by the 1.2 million 
square feet of the Equitable Building.43  Owners of existing buildings, thus, 
wanted to limit new construction that might cause a drop in rents or drive up 
vacancy rates.44  Concerns over the stability of real estate values were not 
constrained, however, to corporate and retail areas in the city.  The NYC 
Ordinance sought also to protect residential properties and, in particular, the 
                                                                                                                                      
 37. Fischler, supra note 30, at 172-73. 
 38. Id. at 170, 172; O’FLAHERTY, supra note 12, at 172-73. 
 39. Fischler, supra note 30, at 173. 
 40. Id. at 178-80. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 180-81. 
 43. O’FLAHERTY, supra note 12, at 172. 
 44. Fischler, supra note 30, at 172-73. 
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single-family home, considered to be the apex of the hierarchy of land uses.45  
The motives for doing so included a mix of technological or environmental 
concerns stemming from incompatible uses; social motives derived from the 
view of zoning as a “moral system that both reflects and assures social 
order,” and economic concerns over the price effect of over-development.46 
This mixture of motives typifies later waves of regulatory measures, 
including the proliferation of various growth-control schemes in suburban 
and metropolitan areas during the 1960s and 1970s, sometimes derogatively 
referred to as “exclusionary zoning.”47  From minimum-lot-size 
requirements to outright moratoria, those measures were motivated by 
current owners’ wishes to limit housing supply.48  In this sense, they feature 
a clear motive influenced by the control of market externalities. 
These economic considerations were intermingled with other motivations, 
which played a more explicit role in the public discourse and legal 
controversies that ensued.  With the rapid development of interstate 
highways, both businesses and lower-income households became physically 
more mobile, allowing them to move from cities into the suburbs.49  
Suburban localities, controlled politically by current homeowners, employed 
various land use controls to restrict development, particularly low-income 
housing opportunities.50 
Localities sought to justify such constraints to guard against technological 
or environmental externalities, such as increased traffic congestion and air 
pollution.51  Fiscal zoning also featured prominently.  Residents of high-
income suburbs feared that admitting families who purchase homes with a 
value below the community average, but who otherwise make equal or 
higher demands on the public infrastructure, such as schools, would lower 
the property tax base per family, thus resulting in an increase in tax rates.52  
Finally, social planning motives seemed to have drawn most of the attention.  
Viewed as measures aimed at discriminating against low-income households 
and racial minorities, zoning and planning programs were debated before 
                                                                                                                                      
 45. Id. at 178. 
 46. Id. 
 47. See, e.g., Robert Inman & Daniel Rubinfeld, The Judicial Pursuit of Local Fiscal 
Equity, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1662, 1685-89 (1979). 
 48. See Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls:  An Economic and Legal 
Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 385, 430 (1977). 
 49. FISCHEL, supra note 24, at § 5.25. 
 50. Id. 
 51. ELLICKSON ET AL., supra note 7, at 850-51. 
 52. Inman & Rubinfeld, supra note 47, at 1685-86. 
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courts, with New Jersey’s Mount Laurel litigation being the epitome of the 
scrutiny such motives faced.53 
Differentiating between the various motives for zoning may, thus, prove 
a difficult task in examining individual instances of government action.54  
This chore is nevertheless essential, especially to the extent that one type of 
motive seeks to hide behind another more defensible ground.  This is 
especially so with market externalities, which have largely remained a legal 
blind spot, although they play a significant practical role in zoning.  The 
following sections set out to analyze each of the above-mentioned types of 
externalities, addressing their treatment in the academic literature and 
application to the legal setting. 
B. Technological or Environmental Externalities 
The British economist Arthur Pigou formalized the concept of 
technological or environmental externalities in the early twentieth century.55  
During the second half of the twentieth century, scholars increasingly 
examined the policy and legal implications of such externalities, with the two 
terms—“technological” and “environmental”—being used 
interchangeably.56  Since then, it has become the subject of extensive 
scholarship.57  Economists define a technological or environmental 
externality as the “indirect effect of a consumption activity or a production 
activity on the consumption set of a consumer, the utility function of a 
consumer, or the production function of a producer.”58  The term “indirect” 
relates to an effect that “does not work through the price system.”59 
Such externalities can be positive, such as when a firm makes available a 
new technology or information that allows other firms to manufacture 
                                                                                                                                      
 53. For an overview of the Mount Laurel litigation, see ELLICKSON ET AL., supra note 7, 
at 758-78 (showing how the New Jersey courts gradually required local governments to 
affirmatively promote low- and modest-income housing by also providing a “builder’s 
remedy” that grants developers a building permit as a right under certain conditions). 
 54. See Eric A. Haunshek & John M. Quigley, Commercial Land Use Regulation and 
Local Government Finance, 80(2) AM. ECON. REV. PAP. & PROC. 176, 177 (1990) (arguing, 
that as an empirical matter, “it is extremely hard to sort out the pecuniary from the [other] 
externality motives for zoning”). 
 55. See ARTHUR C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE, Ch. IX (4th ed. 1932). 
 56. Probably the two most notable examples are Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social 
Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960), and Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, 
Liability Rules, and Inalienability:  One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 
(1972). 
 57. For a partial list of such current works, see Lisa Grow Sun & Brigham Daniels, 
Mirrored Externalities, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 136, 136 n.1 (2014). 
 58. J.J. Laffont, Externalities, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS (Steven 
N. Durlauf and Lawrence E. Blume eds., 2d ed. 2008). 
 59. Id. 
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improved products or to cut costs.60  Negative externalities, which have 
attracted more attention in the policy and law context, prominently include 
adverse environmental effects.  Air pollution is probably the best-articulated 
example.61  Other technological or environmental externalities, which have 
a particular bearing on land use, have also been investigated in both theory 
and practice: noise, groundwater pollution, and the blocking of sunlight or 
the flow of air.62 
A key point in understanding the role of technological or environmental 
externalities in land use regulation concerns the intricate ties between the 
zoning power and otherwise actionable harms, such as private or public 
nuisance.63  On the one hand, zoning emerged as a top-down regulatory 
mechanism that controls in advance certain aspects of conflicting land uses, 
which might otherwise lead to nuisance litigation.  Legislatures and courts 
have explicitly articulated the close ties between zoning and nuisance control 
from the early days of zoning.  As the Supreme Court famously noted in 
Euclid, “a nuisance may be merely a right thing in the wrong place—like a 
pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard.”64  Zoning is thus justified as a 
mechanism that spatially orders land uses to minimize potential cases of 
nuisance. 
Accordingly, zoning is intended to save on transaction costs that parties 
may incur in trying to privately resolve land use conflicts,65 or on the costs 
of nuisance litigation.66  As a doctrinal matter, the fact that an activity is 
“properly conducted at a place authorized for it under zoning” would 
regularly shield it from a private nuisance claim, although the case might be 
somewhat different for some types of public nuisance.67  One further link 
between zoning and nuisance control concerns the “nuisance exception” 
                                                                                                                                      
 60. For a discussion of positive externalities, and their respective economic and legal 
differences from negative ones, see, e.g., Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, Negative Liability, 38 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 21, 22-30 (2009). 
 61. Pigou discussed the adverse effects of smoke from factory chimneys on the 
surrounding community. PIGOU, supra note 55, at Ch. IX., § 10.  This example has also been 
extensively analyzed in the foundational works of Coase, supra note 56, and Calabresi & 
Melamed, supra note 56. 
 62. Consider, for example, Coase’s discussion of the confectioner, the noise and 
vibrations from his machine that disturb a neighboring doctor in his work, and how such a 
conflict may be reframed as a having a reciprocal nature. Ronald H. Coase, The Federal 
Communications Commission, 2 J. L. & ECON. 1, 26-27 (1959). 
 63. See EUGENE MCQUILLIN, 8 THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 25.3 (3d ed. 
2000 & Supp. 2015). 
 64. Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926). 
 65. See Neil Komesar, Housing, Zoning, and the Public Interest, in PUBLIC INTEREST 
LAW:  AN ECONOMIC AND INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 218, 219-21 (Burton A. Weisbrod et al. 
eds., 1978). 
 66. See ELLICKSON ET AL., supra note 7, at 539-68. 
 67. MCQUILLIN, supra note 63, at § 25.13 
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doctrine, which stipulates that some types of land use regulations might not 
constitute a taking even if they proscribe, without compensation, preexisting 
activities that amount to “harmful or noxious uses.”68 
Nevertheless, the zoning power may go well beyond nuisance control.69  
Zoning regulates various types of technological or environmental 
externalities that do not amount to nuisances or other civil wrongs.  For 
example, a zoning decision may impose a density limit to control several 
issues, including the level of traffic congestion within a development and its 
vicinity.  Nuisance law does not regularly hold a car user liable for the 
potential externalities she may cause to other residents or drivers because of 
increased congestion.70  It is not a type of behavior in which the law identifies 
a “wrongdoer” engaging in a harmful conduct toward others.71  In fact, this 
is a type of behavior in which the law is aligned with Coase’s view of 
nonconforming uses or externalities as having a “reciprocal nature,” meaning 
that we cannot categorically identify a “wrongdoer” and a “victim” in such 
scenarios.72  The solution for the lack of clear guidance by private law 
mechanisms is provided by regulation.  One possible venue is a congestion 
fee—functioning as a “Pigouvian tax”—in which car users internalize the 
marginal externalities they generate by the payment of a time-based fee.73  
This is feasible for toll roads, bridges, and tunnels, which serve as 
transportation arteries.  However, it is not regularly the case with residential 
neighborhoods, in which residents are tied to a specific place, meaning that 
fees would not self-resolve congestion problems.  Zoning establishes the 
level of building density that is seen as appropriate for such developments, 
                                                                                                                                      
 68. This doctrine, while controversial and not fully articulated by courts, originates in the 
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considering also on-site and off-site roads, parking, etc.74  Zoning thus deals 
with technological or environmental externalities that go beyond nuisance 
control.  The same holds true for other land use regulations, such as aesthetic 
controls.75  Any such regulation would have to meet the “substantial 
relation” test set up in Euclid and subsequent cases,76 but the underlying 
goals well exceed nuisance control. 
The role of zoning in controlling technological or environmental 
externalities thus bears an important lesson for the other grounds for zoning, 
discussed in the following sections.  The legitimacy of zoning is not 
dependent on demonstrating that a certain developer or a person who uses 
the land engages, or is about to engage, in wrongful conduct (in the private 
law realm).  At the same time, to justify constraints imposed by a zoning 
scheme, the local government must provide a rationale for the ways in which 
land uses and building volumes are regulated.    Moreover, the farther away 
from conduct that would otherwise be considered wrongful, the more the 
municipality would have to ground such constraints in a broad-based 
rationale.  This insight has key implications for regulating market 
externalities. 
C. Fiscal Externalities 
According to the 2012 Census of Governments, state and local 
governments continue to rely heavily on revenues from their own sources to 
finance their expenditures.77  For local governments, taxes represent the 
largest source of general revenue.78  Property taxes are most prominent, 
accounting for 73.5 percent of all local tax revenues.79  Between 2007 and 
2012, local property tax receipts increased by more than fifteen percent.80 
The prominence of local revenue—and property tax in particular—for 
local government finance has always had important implications for land use 
policy.81  In making zoning decisions, local governments may often want to 
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ensure that “households or firms generate a fiscal surplus, not a deficit.”82  
Thus, in considering whether to approve a new zoning scheme, a local 
government may be motivated to compare its expected marginal 
expenditures to its provision of public services with the expected marginal 
public revenues.83 
In the residential context, suburban localities have often resorted to zoning 
mechanisms, such as minimum lot size or other density limits, to thwart 
indirect fiscal deficits.  Such localities are often especially anxious about 
households that purchase small-size properties with a value below the 
community average—and thus pay lower property taxes—but otherwise 
have high demand for public infrastructure and schools.84  The practical 
result of large-lot or other low-density zoning is one in which lower-income 
households with school-aged children would be largely left out of the 
community.  In this sense, the fiscal motive plays an essential role in such 
types of exclusionary zoning.85  The fiscal tradeoff would be different for 
high-value properties.  The same may hold true for retail businesses that 
yield not only property tax revenues but also sales tax receipts.86 
The SZEA empowers local governments to engage in fiscal zoning in the 
residential context by allowing them to control various aspects of private 
development, including the size of the lot, a building’s height, or its 
contribution to overall density.87  Moreover, local governments do not have 
to ground zoning rules, such as minimum lot size, explicitly in fiscal 
considerations.  The reasons for minimum lot size can also be for positive 
environmental externalities—because people value open spaces between 
houses88—so that such zoning rules may otherwise promote Euclid’s idea of 
“general welfare.” 
In some cases, however, the question of legitimacy of fiscal zoning 
becomes explicit.  The most prominent example is “exactions,” requirements 
that “developers provide, or pay for, some public facility or other amenity as 
a condition for receiving permission for a land use.”89    Notwithstanding the 
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various complications entailed in this body of case law,90 as most recently 
expressed in the Supreme Court decision Koontz v. St. Johns River Water 
Management District,91 the focus of the legal debate on exactions can be 
conceptualized as involving the legitimate scope of government control over 
fiscal externalities. 
Prior to the Koontz decision, the benchmark for the judicial review of 
exactions was established in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission92 and 
Dolan v. City of Tigard.93  In Nollan, the Court invalidated a California 
requirement conditioning a building permit for a beachfront property on the 
owner granting a public easement along the mean high tide line.  The Court 
held that such an exaction lacked an “essential nexus” to the project’s 
anticipated effects.94  In Dolan, the court held that a substantial nexus did 
exist between a request to expand a hardware store and pave a parking lot 
and the city’s requirement to hand over a piece of the property for a public 
flood plain and a bicycle path.  However, the Court found that the scope of 
the exaction lacked “rough proportionality” to the expansion’s impact.95  A 
failure to meet the tests of “essential nexus” and “rough proportionality,” 
respectively, triggers the Takings Clause.96  The Court based its rulings on 
the “unconstitutional conditions” doctrine, by which government may not 
condition the granting of a discretionary benefit on the applicant’s waiver of 
a constitutional right—in this case, payment of just compensation for the 
property interest in land taken by the city.97 
In Koontz, a five to four majority applied the Nollan/Dolan framework to 
a case in which the petitioner was denied a permit request to develop 3.7 
acres of privately owned wetland.98  The denial followed Koontz’s refusal to 
make a payment to finance the improvement of the drainage on another tract, 
owned by the government.99  The majority applied the Nollan/Dolan 
standards and the Takings Clause to this required payment, reasoning that 
“the [demand for money] burdened petitioner’s ownership of a specific 
parcel of land.”100  This exaction was, thus, materially different from tax 
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liability.101  Following Koontz, any exaction imposed on a private owner, 
whether in the form of a property interest in land or a monetary obligation, 
must meet the essential nexus/rough proportionality standard. 
What does the jurisprudence on exactions demonstrate about the 
legitimacy of land use regulation, aimed at controlling fiscal externalities 
resulting from private developments?  The Nollan/Dolan standard validates 
such a fiscal motive in principle, provided that the measure taken 
corresponds in both nature and scope to the specific fiscal externality 
generated by the proposed development.  Even under such a heightened 
standard, therefore, the control of fiscal externalities would be considered 
legitimate. 
A question that remains open in the aftermath of Koontz is whether the 
Nollan/Dolan framework applies only to a requirement made on an “ad hoc 
basis upon an individual permit applicant” or also to a “legislatively 
prescribed condition that applied to a broad class of permit applicants.”102  If 
the Nollan/Dolan framework is limited to only “ad hoc” or “adjudicative” 
situations—as the California Supreme Court recently held103—this means 
that “legislative” land use measures, such as a zoning ordinance, would enjoy 
the deferential “substantial relation” standard and would not implicate the 
Takings Clause.  In such a case, the legislative measure would have to create 
a general framework for holding proposed developments accountable to the 
fiscal externalities they are expected to generate.  The challenge for such a 
legislative measure would not be gaining the legitimacy to rely explicitly on 
fiscal considerations.  It would lie, rather, in the ability of a broad-based 
ordinance to anticipate properly the marginal fiscal externalities of a range 
of specific projects in devising internalization mechanisms.104  As Parts II 
and III show, this is exactly the challenge that applies to market externalities. 
D. Social Externalities 
The previous sections have already touched on the various ways in which 
zoning rules, otherwise grounded in considerations of environmental or 
fiscal externalities, may lead to exclusionary social practices—with low-
income households being the usual victims.105  However, the scope of social 
motives for zoning exceeds socioeconomic stratification or even covert 
issues of race and ethnicity.  A municipality, especially one politically 
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dominated by current homeowners,106 may engage in various methods to 
preserve social order through zoning.   It would be particularly legitimate to 
do so when those affected by such measures do not belong to a 
constitutionally protected suspect class and when the social motive can be 
complemented by—or even hidden behind—the control of environmental or 
fiscal externalities. 
A notable example is Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,107 in which the 
Supreme Court upheld the village’s restriction of residential land uses to one-
family dwellings based on the ordinance’s definition of “family” as “[o]ne 
or more persons related by blood, adoption, or marriage, living and cooking 
together as a single housekeeping unit . . . ”108  As a result, a village 
homeowner was barred from leasing his home to six college students.109 
The Court rejected equal protection and other constitutional claims 
against the zoning measure and relied on a mix of environmental and social 
externality rationales.110  It reasoned that “a quiet place where yards are wide, 
people few, and motor vehicles restricted are legitimate guidelines in a land 
use project addressed to family needs.”111  The Court also held that “the 
police power is not confined to elimination of filth, stench, and unhealthy 
places.  It is ample to lay out zones where family values, youth values, and 
the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air make the area a sanctuary for 
people.”112 
According to the Court, therefore, the negative externalities generated by 
a house occupied by college students comprise both environmental and 
social externalities, and the village could legitimately control them.113  Next 
to urban problems of congestion and noise,114 the Court viewed the presence 
of housekeeping units outside the scope of a “family”—as the zoning 
measure defined the term—as adversely affecting the village’s “values.”115  
While controversial, this decision seems to give a mandate to at least some 
sort of social planning via zoning. 
However, social planning via zoning need not be necessarily about 
exclusion.  In fact, the growing phenomenon of “inclusionary zoning” 
measures, by which localities require or encourage developers to include 
                                                                                                                                      
 106. See FISCHEL, supra note 24, at § 5.24. 
 107. 416 U.S. 1 (1974). 
 108. Id. at 2. 
 109. Id. at 1. 
 110. Id. at 9. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. 416 U.S. 9 (1974). 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
378 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLIV 
below-market-priced units in residential projects,116 is embedded in a 
concept of positive social externalities.  The U.S. Department of Housing 
and Urban Development (“HUD”) has long adopted a policy, according to 
which the “integration of affordable units into market-rate projects creates 
opportunities for households with diverse socioeconomic backgrounds to 
live in the same developments” and providing access to the “same types of 
community services and amenities.”117 
Beyond the static concept of social justice, by which low- and modest-
income households are able to afford housing in high demand areas, the 
rationale of inclusionary zoning also features a dynamic component that 
deals with positive social externalities.118 
An underlying assumption that drives inclusionary zoning is positive 
synergy between different socioeconomic groups, serving mostly the 
interests of low- and modest-income households, and children in particular, 
while not harming upper-income households.  Mixed-income 
neighborhoods, thus, arguably come closer to a socially optimal 
interpersonal spatial design.119  While such inclusionary zoning mechanisms 
have had a fair number of critics120 and existing data does not always point 
to success,121 the positive social externalities remain a driving motivation of 
housing policy. 
A 2015 decision by the California Supreme Court, California Building 
Industry Association v. City of San Jose,122 highlights both the current 
features of inclusionary zoning and the way such schemes are viewed as 
entailing positive social externalities.  In 2010, the City of San Jose enacted 
an inclusionary zoning ordinance, requiring developers of twenty or more 
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housing units to sell fifteen percent of the for-sale units at a price affordable 
to low- and moderate-income households.123  The ordinance offered 
developers several alternatives to the provision of on-site affordable units—
such as provision of a higher number of off-site affordable units or payment 
of a substitute fee—but strongly pushed developers toward the on-site 
alternative.124  Upholding the ordinance, the Court identified the ordinance’s 
legitimate purposes not only of increasing the number of affordable housing 
units, but more particularly, of “assuring that new affordable housing units 
that are constructed are distributed throughout the city as part of mixed-
income developments in order to obtain the benefits that flow from 
economically diverse communities.”125 
The Court further viewed the requirement to sell fifteen percent of the for-
sale units at an affordable price as a condition that “simply places a 
restriction on the way the developer may use its property,” similar to other 
land use regulations or a rent control ordinance, which do not amount to 
exactions.126  The Court reviewed the ordinance under a “reasonable 
relationship” standard, so that the City did not have to demonstrate the 
Nollan/Dolan nexus between the development and the additional need for 
affordable housing.127  Following the California Building Industry 
Association decision, a government’s use of on-site inclusionary zoning to 
promote positive social externalities in mixed-income neighborhoods is not 
subjected to heightened scrutiny of its fiscal motives. 
As a final note, in 2015, New York City Mayor Bill de Blasio unveiled 
his plans to enact a citywide ordinance that will require all developers 
seeking to rezone land for housing to build a specific number of on-site 
affordable units.128  The inclusionary zoning provisions are “hard, new 
requirements that for the very first time set a floor for the affordable housing 
communities are owed in new developments.”129  The focus on on-site units 
seeks to promote the social externalities of mixed-income housing.  The 
program was approved by the city council in March 2016.130  Accordingly, 
the promotion of inclusionary social externalities in New York City is no 
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longer done by ad hoc requirements but, instead, through a citywide policy 
anchored in zoning laws.  The promotion of positive social externalities is 
now explicitly enshrined in the zoning power. 
E. Pecuniary and Market Externalities 
Alongside the analysis of technological or environmental externalities, 
economists have also considered the role of pecuniary externalities, which 
work through the price system.131  In a market economy, certain activities by 
persons or firms change relative prices or affect the value of assets.  These 
changes create benefits for, or impose costs on, third parties.132  Economists 
regularly argue that pecuniary externalities do not affect welfare 
economics.133  They suggest that “the ability of new firms to enter an industry 
and inflict pecuniary losses on existing firms is the process that generates 
efficiency in competitive markets.”134  Allowing firms to inflict losses on 
competitors may be viewed as necessary for economic efficiency.  Because 
market actors have property rights over the resources they own but not over 
their future value, they are not entitled to compensation for pecuniary losses 
inflicted on them by other market actors.135 
Over the past decades, however, some economists have acknowledged 
that, in the realistic world of imperfect markets, pecuniary externalities may 
have welfare effects.  Paul Krugman has notably shown that in a world of 
imperfect competition and increasing returns to scale, pecuniary externalities 
do matter.136  Market-size effects are a particular source of pecuniary 
externalities with genuine welfare impacts, and these, in turn, have 
substantial implications for siting choices of firms and the ordering of land 
uses.137 
Krugman examines manufacturers whose industries, unlike agricultural 
producers, are typified by increasing returns to scale and a relatively compact 
use of land.138  Manufacturers generally prefer to locate factories near their 
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demand markets, because this reduces transportation costs.139  The source of 
the demand, however, does not come only from the agricultural sector or 
from end-consumers.  It is also derived from within the manufacturing sector 
itself.140 
The result is one of agglomeration or geographical concentration, and it is 
embedded in positive, reciprocal pecuniary externalities.  On the supply side, 
“manufacturer production will tend to concentrate where there is a large 
market, but the market will be large where manufactures production is 
concentrated.”141  On the demand side, firms will tend to “live and produce 
near a concentration of manufacturing production because it will then be less 
expensive to buy the goods their central place provides.”142 
Accordingly, the demand for certain land uses, and the regulatory 
considerations that need to be taken into account in ordering land uses, might 
implicate market externalities that have genuine welfare effects.  Consider, 
for example, a plan to rezone agricultural land, located at the fringe of an 
industrial zone.  The developer intends to set up an industrial plant that will 
manufacture steel products.  In deciding whether to approve such a 
development, the municipality should consider not only technological or 
environmental externalities, such as increased pollution, or fiscal 
externalities, such as increased pressure on public roads, but also potential 
market externalities.  If the presence of the steel plant will benefit other 
industries already located in the adjacent industrial zone—serving both the 
demand and supply side of the industrial products market—this positive 
market externality should be considered. 
This does not mean, of course, that the concentration of similar land uses 
will always generate positive market externalities with an overall welfare 
effect.  This is especially true concerning retail businesses, in which the issue 
of an internal supply and demand of products among businesses themselves 
is less relevant.  Market externalities will apply mostly to the effect that 
businesses have on other businesses in positively or negatively attracting 
customers.  Several studies have examined the effects of large retail 
businesses on revenues of other retailers and local employment rates, coming 
at times to different conclusions: some works seek to document the adverse 
effects that Wal-Mart stores have on other retail firms and total retail 
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employment,143 while other studies show positive pecuniary externalities 
that large retailers generate for nearby retail establishments.144 
In a recent study of the effects of big-box retailers on nearby 
establishments, Daniel Shoag and Stan Veuger offer a theory that seeks to 
bridge previous studies.145  They argue that while the overall pecuniary 
effects of large retailers are positive, directly competing retailers are 
economically harmed by the presence of a big-box store.146  The businesses 
that are positively impacted by their presence are ones that depend heavily 
on foot traffic, such as small retailers or restaurants.  This also means that 
such positive externalities are negatively correlated with distance from the 
big retailer, meaning that such positive effects will be particularly significant 
within approximately a one-mile radius.147  Moreover, this positive 
dependence has welfare effects, because many of these affected businesses 
cannot relocate in the event that the big-box store closes down.148 
From a broader perspective, localities making zoning decisions should 
consider three types of market externalities: (1) welfare effects, (2) 
distributive effects, and (3) “second-hand” off-site environmental or fiscal 
externalities. 
First, developers’ siting choices and resulting zoning decisions may yield 
market externalities with a genuine welfare effect.  Importantly, adjacent 
land users, who may be positively or negatively affected by a decision to 
rezone land or to otherwise approve a certain development, should not be 
seen as having an enforceable individual legal interest concerning market 
externalities.  Adversely affected competitors should not be entitled to block 
a development because of potential market externalities, the same way that 
positively affected land users are not in a position to force the municipality 
to approve the project.  Yet zoning goes beyond identifying specific legal 
interests that may be otherwise enforceable or actionable.  Just as 
considerations of technological or environmental externalities extend 
beyond the prevention of nuisances that would be otherwise actionable in 
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private law litigation, so do market externalities merit consideration by local 
governments if such externalities entail potential welfare effects. 
Second, the distribution of positive market externalities, notwithstanding 
aggregate welfare effects, may also be a legitimate consideration in zoning 
decisions.  Economists have tended to view such distributive grounds 
suspiciously, suggesting that the political process may allow powerful 
industries to protect their pecuniary interests at the expense of promoting 
overall welfare, such as by blocking competing land uses.149 
As Sections II.A and III.A show, there is indeed room for concern when 
decisions driven by market externalities seek merely to serve as an 
anticompetitive, or an otherwise protectionist measure, at the expense of 
competitors and other stakeholders.150  Yet distributive considerations that 
stem from market externalities should not always be considered normatively 
inadequate, especially when they are grounded in broad-based policy 
decisions.  Section II.C discusses, for example, the pecuniary effects that 
market-rate developments may entail for low- and modest-income 
households.151  To the extent that inclusionary zoning schemes are grounded 
in such market externalities and are part of a broad-based policy that 
addresses access to housing, the consideration of market externalities and 
their distributive effects may be legitimately weighed in such decisions. 
Third, market externalities may also indirectly generate second-hand off-
site technological, environmental, or fiscal externalities.  Section II.A 
discusses the effects that a big-box store, such as IKEA or Wal-Mart, may 
have on small retail businesses located in the municipality’s CBD.152  A land 
use decision approving big-box development may create adverse market 
externalities for nearby businesses.  In some cases, the closing down of a 
critical mass of retailers and related businesses, such as restaurants, may 
cause the CBD to decline.  As documented in numerous studies, such an 
urban decline may have long-lasting effects that also feature adverse 
technological or environmental or fiscal externalities—ones that take years 
and much effort to reverse.153 
This does not mean that the interests of businesses and other stakeholders 
in the CBD should always prevail over those of developers, who may have a 
legitimate business interest in operating somewhere else.  Moreover, such 
developers are not individually responsible for the adverse results of such 
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urban decay, such as physical blight or a decreased sense of security among 
remaining residents and businesses.  No individual legal fault should be 
attributed to such developers for second hand off-site effects.  Yet, here, too, 
the zoning power could extend beyond harms that are otherwise actionable 
in private law to regulate adverse market externalities. 
II.  THE REGULATION OF MARKET EXTERNALITIES 
This Part moves to explore in more detail three settings in which zoning 
and land use decisions may entail market externalities.  It looks at the current 
judicial approach to the validity of such considerations, pointing to hitherto 
unobserved similarities between cases.  This analysis leads to the 
construction of a unified theory. 
A. Entry of Commercial Uses 
Any type of land use regulation that places practical limits on 
development may generate market externalities.  In the housing context, 
several authors have argued that restrictive regulation is the key variable that 
explains increasing housing costs.154  Such market effects in the residential 
context serve the interests of existing homeowners in high demand areas, 
incentivizing them to influence the political and regulatory process.155 
Because of the large number and dispersed nature of existing homeowners 
and, even more so, of adversely affected end users (i.e., prospective buyers 
and renters), controversies about land use decisions that restrict development 
formally feature the developer, neighbors, and the local government as the 
disputants.156  Local governments tend to rely in such cases on explicit 
considerations embedded in the control of technological or fiscal 
externalities, and judicial review determines the deference to such 
considerations.157 
Matters change, however, when the regulation implicates the entry of 
commercial uses.  The developer will usually have a financial stake in the 
long-term profitability of the commercial use, for example, the retail 
revenues that a big-box store would generate over time.158  At the other end, 
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while some residents or interest groups may object to the project due to 
environmental or fiscal externalities, current retailers or related businesses 
would seek to play an explicit role given the potential market externalities 
that the development entails.  Even if courts deny standing to retailers made 
anxious by competition, such stakeholders may seek to employ at least one 
of two tactics: funding litigation for residents or groups with standing159 or 
lobbying the government to protect their interests.  In the latter case, if the 
government supports such interests, it would typically tie its reservations to 
general concerns over the economic viability of the relevant area or 
industry.160 
How should land use regulation draw the normative dividing line between 
anticompetitive behavior, tailored to promote the particular interests of an 
existing commercial user, and legitimate broad-based considerations of 
market externalities?  Market externalities should be evaluated along the 
three dimensions presented above: (1) welfare effects; (2) distributive 
concerns; (3) control of second-hand, off-site environmental/fiscal 
externalities.161  Additionally, the need to rely on a broad-based issue in such 
matters entails both economic and legal considerations. 
From an economic perspective, market externalities are inherently the 
manifestation of a change to a certain preexisting market-equilibrium.162  
This change implicates numerous parties on both the supply and demand 
sides.  An understanding of the geographical scope and the kind of industries 
affected by the entry of a commercial development cannot rely solely on 
simple proxies, such as a fixed distance or estimated revenues per square 
foot.  The calculation goes well beyond a zero-sum game between existing 
and future retailers.  Evaluating the effects of market externalities requires 
local governments to have a broader understanding of the commercial 
activity that takes place within its area’s borders (and also outside of them, 
as Section III.B shows) and how positive or negative market externalities 
affect not only direct competitors but also related businesses.  As suggested 
above,163 the entry of a competing commercial use, such as a big-box retailer, 
may have a very different effect on existing retailers than is the case with a 
nearby complementary business, such as a restaurant.164 
Moreover, from the point of view of aggregate welfare, a regulatory 
analysis of market externalities—and the effect of a prospective 
development on the economic viability of preexisting commercial 
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activities—requires the municipality to take a general stand on matters that 
are at the basis of agglomeration economics.  For example, does the city 
place a special value on downtown business districts that feature a multitude 
of small- and medium-scale retailers, or does it prefer retail economy 
concentrated at its perimeter? 
The same dilemmas also touch on the two other dimensions of market 
externalities.  A decision by a local government to prefer small- and medium-
scale businesses to large-scale retailers because of distributive 
considerations must consider the implications of a regulatory decision on 
other small businesses that are not direct competitors of the prospective large 
retailer and which may be generally better off situating themselves near such 
big businesses.165  If the city wishes to differentiate between various types 
of businesses in its distributive agenda—e.g., it seeks to preserve small 
fashion stores but it is less concerned about protecting mom and pop 
restaurants—it should not only offer a normatively valid reason for this 
differential treatment of small businesses but also design its commercial 
zones to achieve such a result.  The same requirement for a broad policy 
should apply to the control of second-hand environmental externalities or 
fiscal effects.  If the city is determined to decrease the prospects that its CBD 
will become rundown, it should have an explicit policy on what types of 
businesses are inherently essential for the economic viability of the CBD as 
a whole or are particularly prone to market externalities. 
From a legal perspective, a broad-based policy regulating the entry of 
commercial uses, due to considerations of market externalities, is justified 
because existing private-law mechanisms (such as nuisance law) may fail to 
resolve certain types of externalities.  As suggested earlier, the further away 
one moves from land uses that may otherwise constitute a wrong in private 
law, the greater the burden on the local government to ground its restrictions 
in a broad-based policy.166  Of all externalities, market externalities are most 
often reciprocal—Coase’s term—in identifying the normativity of the 
conduct.167  Therefore, to the extent that a land use regulation limits the entry 
of a commercial use because of market externalities, the regulation must 
show how such a decision promotes Euclidean general welfare, in the most 
genuine sense, and why such a decision is not merely a pretext for preserving 
the status quo in the service of a politically powerful economic actor.  Even 
within the “substantial relation” deferential standard,168 a legal limit based 
on market externalities must rely on a credible broad-based policy. 
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These insights may be instrumental in delineating the normative dividing 
line between legally inadequate protectionism and a legitimate control of 
market externalities, even if existing businesses may benefit from limits on 
entry of commercial uses in both cases. 
Consider, on the one hand, the legal controversy over zoning limits placed 
on the entry of “formula businesses,” typified by a “standardized array of 
services or merchandise, trademark, logo, service mark, symbol, decor, 
architecture, layout, uniform, or similar standardized feature.”169  This term 
seeks to capture major national retailers, such as Wal-Mart, McDonalds, or 
Starbucks. 
Numerous municipalities in the United States have placed limits on such 
retailers, subjecting them to special permit procedures or economic impact 
reviews.170  The reasons provided for such limits are usually grounded in 
preserving an appropriate balance of small-, medium-, and large-scale 
businesses, or in controlling other effects that such retailers may have on the 
community.171  However, courts have scrutinized such regulations, 
especially when similar limits were not placed on other large businesses that 
do not have standardized features, meaning that the true motive for such 
limits is a targeted policy against specific retailers, not a general policy on 
the preservation of small businesses or the viability of the CBD.172  This 
targeted policy in the guise of market externality analysis is especially 
prominent in the context of Wal-Mart, where labor unions seek to use 
municipal zoning regulations to prevent the entry of Wal-Mart stores.173 
On the other hand, courts have been more deferential to zoning regulations 
that are grounded in a broad-based policy.  In Hernandez v. City of Hanford, 
the California Supreme Court upheld a 2003 amendment to the city’s zoning 
ordinance.174  Aimed at protecting the “economic viability of Hanford’s 
downtown commercial district,” typified by a large number of “regionally 
well-regarded retail furniture stores,” the original ordinance prohibited the 
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sale of furniture in another commercial district, the “PC district.”175  The 
amendment created a special exception for large department stores—those 
with at least 50,000 square feet of floor space—located in the PC district, 
allowing them to sell furniture within a specifically described area of no 
more than 2500 square feet in the department store.176  In so doing, the 
amendment sought to add to the original goal of preserving the economic 
viability of the downtown commercial district a new goal of attracting the 
“type of large department stores that the city views as essential to the 
economic viability of the PC district.”177 
The court viewed both goals as legitimate purposes and validated the 
zoning measures taken to attain them.  Surveying the history of the zoning 
ordinance and its amendments, the court noted that, when the PC district was 
established in the late 1980s, a city committee identified types of commercial 
uses already established in the downtown district and which the city did not 
want removed to the PC district.  These uses included car dealerships, banks, 
professional offices, and furniture stores.178 
The court concluded that the zoning power extended to the regulation of 
economic competition to advance a legitimate public goal.179  It held that a 
zoning ordinance is not necessarily invalid because it has the effect of 
limiting competition.  Zoning actions in which the “regulation of economic 
competition reasonably could be viewed as a direct and intended effect” 
would be valid as long as the primary purpose is a “valid public purpose such 
as furthering a municipality’s general plan . . . for localized commercial 
development” rather than simply serving a business’s private 
anticompetitive interests.180 
Thus, for example, a city’s decision to limit the entry of discount 
superstores and to organize its commercial development in existing 
neighborhood shopping centers would be legitimate, even if it has a “direct 
and intended effect of regulating competition.”181  Such zoning would be 
valid as long as it serves legitimate purposes, such as maintaining the 
“vitality and economic viability of the city’s neighborhood commercial 
centers,” thus avoiding an “urban/suburban decay” that might result from the 
shifting of commercial activity.182 
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In this case, in working to preserve the downtown district, the City of 
Hanford identified in advance the types of commercial uses that served as 
the economic anchors of district.183  Similarly, the local government 
identified department stores as the commercial anchor of the PC district and 
ordered the types and scope of commercial land uses within the district.184  
Therefore, the zoning ordinance did reflect a broad-based policy, not one 
merely tailored to protect private revenue streams of specific stores.  For 
example, the Hanford zoning ordinance did nothing to limit the entry of new 
furniture stores in the downtown district or new department stores in the PC 
district.185  It did not limit the number of competitors, instead regulating their 
spatial distribution.  Hernandez exemplifies how an explicit consideration of 
market externalities may be normatively legitimate when it relies on a broad-
based policy. 
B. Renting Out Investment Property 
The economic literature deals extensively with the market effects of 
investment in real estate made for speculative purposes.186  Researchers have 
tried to determine if real estate speculation is primarily a cause for or a 
symptom of a property cycle, with one prominent study concluding that the 
effects of speculation appear to be dominated by the price elasticity of the 
housing supply.187  This means that markets with more responsive regulatory 
environments or with less physical constraints on increasing housing supply 
will experience lower price volatility, as well as less speculative behavior.188  
An analysis of the U.S. real estate housing market and its price fluctuations 
between 1960 and 2011 suggests that the pre-2000 era was dominated by 
periodic “intrinsic bubbles,” with buyers overreacting to changes in the costs 
of renting.189  In contrast, the post-2000 period is dominated by “rational 
speculative bubbles” in which buyers cease to be influenced by underlying 
fundamental market factors and, instead, become “fixated on nonlinearly 
extrapolating the historical growth in housing prices” and attempt to guess 
future trends by looking at past price trajectories.190 
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At the local level, such property investment—if it reaches a critical 
mass—creates market externalities at both ends of the price fluctuations.  
When the market is dominated by investors and prices go up precipitously, 
existing homeowners stand to gain, but potential households seeking to enter 
the municipality for long-term residency may be left out.  Adversely, when 
the bubble crashes—as in the subprime crisis—current homeowners are also 
adversely affected by the sharp decrease.191  This is especially so when high-
leverage property investments end up in foreclosure.  In addition to 
environmental externalities resulting from vacancies and neglect of 
distressed assets, which may then translate into lower prices for adjacent 
properties,192 some authors attribute foreclosure externalities to a supply 
effect by which nearby foreclosure increases competition among sellers, thus 
leading to lower transaction prices for adjacent non-distressed properties.193  
Although foreclosures are not unique to investment properties, speculative 
buyers tend to be particularly footloose when the asset’s net value goes 
below their cash contribution.194 
Assuming that a certain municipality concludes that a high rate of 
investment-based housing unit acquisition might create adverse market 
externalities, what measures can it take to mitigate this phenomenon through 
its land use regulation powers?  A flat prohibition on investment-driven 
purchases or other measures directly targeting a certain group of purchasers, 
such as differential real estate transfer tax rates, would exceed the authority 
of municipalities.195  Such measures may prove constitutionally problematic 
even when taken by state or federal governments.196  Municipalities must 
thus find ways that focus on the land use rather than chiefly on the identity 
of the user and that are reasonably related to the goal of increasing market 
stability. 
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One technique that may be used for this purpose is to regulate the scope 
and manner of renting out housing units in the municipality, such as by 
putting a cap on the overall number of rental properties or establishing rules 
of use that would limit short-term rentals.197  As for the latter, the use of 
consecutive short-term rentals has gained currency among investors over the 
past few years, especially with the introduction of web platforms such as 
Airbnb.198  One clear and probably uncontroversial way to control short-term 
rentals would be to clarify the distinction between housing and hotel uses in 
the zoning ordinance.199  Yet, cities might need to resort to other measures 
to control against the broader market externalities that result from investment 
property. 
As the following paragraphs show, lessons learned from the limited case 
law on such rental restrictions indicate that a broadly applied ordinance, 
intended to alleviate market externalities, is more likely to withstand judicial 
scrutiny than an individually applied measure.  Similar to the discussion in 
Sections I.E and II.A in the context of regulating the entry of commercial 
uses,200 the need for a broad-based policy relies on both economics and law. 
Consider two state cases.  In Gangemi v. Zoning Board of Appeals of 
Fairfield, the Connecticut Supreme Court invalidated the conditioning of a 
variance to the zoning ordinance’s setback requirements on prohibiting the 
applicants from renting out their beach property.201 The zoning board 
grounded its condition in the “uniqueness” of the beach property.202  The 
board argued that this ban would promote “the public health of the 
neighborhood” as well as its “general welfare” and would “conserve the 
value of the buildings located in the neighborhood.”203 
Holding that restrictions on the free alienation of property are not upheld 
“unless they serve a legal and useful purpose,” the court noted that the 
proposed limitation did “not adhere to the rest of the property owners in the 
beach district.”204  Such a disparity “gives those other property owners a 
grossly unfair advantage over the plaintiffs in the marketplace.”205  Put in 
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other terms, imposing a restriction on a single property would not “conserve 
the value of the buildings located in the neighborhood,”206 because renting it 
out would not create any change to the market equilibrium.  From a legal 
perspective, the court found unjustified the singling out of such faultless 
behavior—to the extent that what is at stake is only a market externality.207 
In contrast, in the recent Dean v. City of Winona case, the Minnesota Court 
of Appeals held that a municipal ordinance, limiting to thirty percent the 
number of lots on a block eligible to obtain certification as a rental property, 
was a valid exercise of the city’s police power and did not violate the 
appellants’ constitutional rights.208  The explicit problem resulting from the 
previous overabundance of rental properties was a shortage in parking—a 
technological and fiscal externality—and the cure provided by the 
amendment was to apply the thirty percent quota to blocks within designated 
city districts.209  The court concluded that the “public has a sufficient interest 
in rental housing to justify a municipality’s use of police power as a means 
of regulating such housing.”210  It held that the application of the cap through 
the districts’ blocks and the fact that rental certifications are awarded on a 
“first-come first-served basis” preclude constitutional arguments concerning 
equal protection or due process violations.211  Since “the owners of certified 
rental properties do not determine which other lots may be certified”212 and 
the “30% cap was adopted after long-deliberate information gathering 
process,” the court rejected the arguments about protectionism in the guise 
of policy.213 
While the City of Winona’s ordinance was concerned mostly with the 
control of technological or environmental and fiscal externalities resulting 
from congestion, a similar zoning ordinance might instead seek to control 
the potential market externalities resulting from the over-abundance of 
investment property.  This does not mean, of course, that all municipalities 
would necessarily consider investment property as generating adverse 
market effects.  Many municipalities in the United States pride themselves 
on being magnets to wealthy investors.  For example, foreign magnates 
purchase multi-million dollar units in Manhattan’s high-end condominiums, 
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which they rarely set foot in, with New York City facilitating such 
acquisitions.214 
Yet many other decision makers may come to a different conclusion about 
the desirability of property investment within their respective 
jurisdictions.215  The massive presence of investors, especially those who 
look for a quick profit on resale and who, in the meantime, engage in 
consecutive short-term leases, might generate market externalities that could 
have both aggregate welfare and distributive effects.  This may also result in 
second-hand environmental externalities if a market crash will lead to mass 
foreclosures.  To the extent that a municipality’s policy relies on a broad-
based view of its real estate market, and subsequent zoning measures are not 
applied on an ad hoc basis or otherwise used to single out homeowners, such 
measures should be considered legitimate. 
C. Inclusionary Zoning and Market Nexus 
Section I.D discussed inclusionary zoning and how the California 
Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in California Building Industry Association 
v. City of San Jose216 validated the requirement for on-site, below-market-
rate units to promote the positive social externalities of mixed-income 
neighborhoods.217  In addition to facilitating positive social externalities, 
inclusionary zoning can also control market externalities generated by new 
developments. 
To understand what types of market externalities may exist in the case of 
new residential projects, and how inclusionary zoning requirements may 
work to internalize such externalities, consider the following legislative 
findings from San Jose’s inclusionary zoning ordinance, cited by the 
California Supreme Court in its decision: 
New residents of market-rate housing place demands on services provided 
by both public and private sectors, creating a demand for new employees. 
Some of these public and private sector employees needed to meet the 
needs of the new residents earn incomes only adequate to pay for affordable 
housing.  Because affordable housing is in short supply in the city, such 
employees may be forced to live in less than adequate housing within the 
city, pay a disproportionate share of their incomes to live in adequate 
housing in the city, or commute ever increasing distances to their jobs from 
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housing located outside the city.  These circumstances harm the city’s 
ability to attain employment and housing goals articulated in the city’s 
general plan and place strains on the city’s ability to accept and service new 
market-rate housing development.218 
Put in simple terms: the development of market-rate units brings in new 
households to the city.  The households use their income to consume goods 
and services.  This additional consumption translates into new jobs.  Many 
of these jobs, such as in the retail, restaurant, and health-care industries, are 
low-compensation jobs.  This results in new low-income households unable 
to afford market-rate housing units in the city219 and creates an aggregate 
“affordability gap” embedded in market conditions.220  Because developers 
generate market externalities, which operate through the price system, they 
should internalize them by providing below-market units or paying in lieu 
fees.221  This establishes a market nexus that should be regulated by 
inclusionary zoning. 
The California Supreme Court did not explicitly address this type of 
market externality logic.  It reasoned, instead, that the City of San Jose could 
promote a legitimate goal of “increasing the number of affordable housing 
units in the city in recognition of the insufficient number of existing 
affordable housing units” and that the zoning measures should only establish 
a general “reasonable relationship” to such a goal.222  However, this section 
expands the market externality logic, showing how it could be tied to the 
state’s broad land use policy. 
Since 1980, California has required each local jurisdiction to plan for its 
share of the state’s housing need for households of all income levels.  Under 
this “Housing Element Law,”223 localities are required to adopt the housing 
elements as part of their general plans, which should account for both 
existing and projected housing needs, and to submit such housing elements 
for state certification.224  The Regional Housing Need Allocation (“RHNA”) 
is the state-mandated process that identifies, for each eight-year period, the 
total number of housing units that each municipality must accommodate in 
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its housing element.225  In the first stage, the state Department of Housing 
and Community Development determines the total housing needs, by 
affordability level, for each region in the state.  Then, each regional “council 
of governments” is tasked with distributing these needs to local 
governments.226 
Such regional and local RHNA allocations are divided into four income 
categories that encompass all levels of housing affordability: “very low” (up 
to fifty percent of the Area Median Income (“AMI”)); “low” (fifty-one to 
eighty percent of AMI); “moderate” (81-120% of AMI); and “above 
moderate” (above 120% of AMI).227  “Once the municipality receives its 
RHNA allocation, it must update the housing element of its general plan to 
show how it plans to meet the housing needs in its community.”228 
Importantly, the RHNA is a zoning requirement, meaning that cities must 
ensure their zoning schemes can accommodate the mandated housing 
elements, not that they actually produce those housing units.229  This 
distinction is essential both legally and practically.  While in some cases 
reluctant localities have been sued for failing to meet their RHNA zoning 
requirements, in most cases, zoning ordinances allow for a sufficient amount 
of housing, but the actual development is not completed.230  This 
development gap occurs predominantly in all affordability levels below 
“above moderate” market-rate development.  This is due to constant 
defunding by the federal government for the “very low” housing 
programs,231 recent changes at the state level—such as the 2012 abolition of 
redevelopment agencies and Tax Increment Financing (“TIF”) programs that 
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had dedicated considerable funds to affordable housing232—and  local 
political and financial obstacles to development.233 
Inclusionary zoning schemes are therefore intended to bridge the gap 
between formal zoning for residential uses and the creation of mechanisms 
that will enable the actual development of affordable units across all income 
categories (based on the proposition that households should not spend over 
thirty percent of their income on housing costs).234  More than 170 localities 
in California already adopted such schemes, offering different mixtures of 
inclusionary zoning alternatives including on-site units, off-site units, in lieu 
fees, dedication of land, or rehabilitation of existing affordable housing.235 
The choice of the inclusionary zoning mechanisms may implicate both the 
legal standard that would apply to such zoning measures and the technique 
used to quantify the scope of market externalities created by the market-rate 
developments.  It should be noted that the California Supreme Court’s 
embrace of the deferential standard in San Jose was based on the conclusion 
that limiting the sale price of fifteen percent of the on-site units constitutes 
nothing more than a regulation of land use, within the scope of the city’s 
police power.236 
The legal standard may be, however, somewhat different for inclusionary 
zoning schemes that focus on market-rate rental projects or on the increasing 
tendency of California cities to embrace a mechanism of straight fees, instead 
of in lieu fees—thus allowing the city to support unit production independent 
of the given project for which the fee is assessed.237  If a city establishes a 
legislative formula for a fee, whether explicitly defined as a mitigation fee 
covered under the Mitigation Fee Act238 or otherwise substantially intended 
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 238. CAL GOV’T CODE § 66001. 
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to offset the social costs of a project, it has to show a “reasonable relationship 
between the fee’s use and the type of development project on which the fee 
is imposed.”239  A fee established legislatively in a zoning ordinance would 
not be subject to the Nollan/Dolan strict standard for ad hoc exactions, 
because it is not tied to the particular effects of a specific project but, rather, 
to the usual effects that such types of projects generate.  On the other hand, 
the “reasonable relationship” is more demanding than the general standard 
that applies to the exercise of the police power, which looks more generally 
at the public goal.240 
To meet the “reasonable relationship” standard that applies to the 
legislative setting of a fee channeled to affordable housing, cities in 
California are increasingly engaging in a “nexus” study, seeking to show the 
generic market effect of market-rate developments on low-compensation 
employees who enter the job market and must now search for housing.241  
These nexus studies clearly focus on market externalities.  These studies do 
not deal with technological or environmental externalities or with fiscal ones.  
They do not focus on the project-specific effects of the development but on 
its general ones by establishing the projects’ statistical share in the overall 
market effect.242 
For example, a nexus study, prepared for the City of San Jose in 2014, 
showed support for a new legislative scheme for fees imposed on developers 
of market-rate rental projects (thus not covered under the 2010 ordinance 
upheld by the California court).243  The study’s methodology relied on the 
Impact Analysis for Planning (“IMPLAN”) model, which quantified the 
effects of changes in a local economy, including impacts of changes in 
income on employment.244  In essence, the study worked in modules of one 
hundred market-rate housing units built by the developer.  It calculated the 
overall free income of such market-rate households and its impact on job 
creation in the local economy.  It then identified the types of new jobs 
created, including low- and modest-income jobs, and the “affordability gap” 
that exists for new worker households that require subsidies or other forms 
of public assistance to afford housing in or around the community.  The 
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overall amount of public expenditures required to close the “affordability 
gap” is then broken-down to 1/100 shares to calculate the fee imposed on 
each market-rate unit.245 
This type of market nexus analysis is embraced throughout California, 
although localities regularly establish the fee at a lower threshold than the 
maximum.246  San Mateo County conducted, in 2015, a comprehensive 
nexus analysis for twenty-one localities.247  With the tailwind provided by 
the recent San Jose case, more localities may follow suit. 
The key lesson provided by this methodology is how the economic nexus 
study is translated into a regulatory and legal framework.  Developers and, 
through them, market-rate households are required to account for the market 
externalities they generate.  This mechanism is inherently based on a broad 
analysis.  It does not—and cannot—attribute an “earmarked” market 
externality to a single unit.  It is based on a system of statistical extrapolation 
and then distribution.  This is understandable from an economic perspective 
because market changes are a result of aggregate changes in supply and 
demand.  A single household does not create a discernible market change in 
housing.  The aggregation of new residential developments does create such 
a change. 
From a legal perspective, the use of a broad-based formula to calculate the 
individual fee representing a market-rate unit’s pro rata contribution to the 
market externality is sound policy.   It does not single out a developer or a 
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 246. Interview with Eric Angstadt, supra note 233. 
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unit owner for their individual generation of a market externality.  It 
identifies, rather, the typical market externality that such projects generate 
and entrenches it in a legislative formula that does not favor specific 
developers or land users over others.  In so doing, this broad-based scheme 
should be seen as meeting the legal standard of reasonable relationship 
between the “fee’s use and the type of development project on which the fee 
is imposed.”248  It seeks to capture a broad economic phenomenon and 
regulate it through zoning power. 
III.  JUDICIAL REVIEW OF MARKET-BASED ZONING 
This Part consolidates the lessons learned from the cases presented in Part 
II and offers a general framework for legitimizing the broad-based regulation 
of market externalities.  It then addresses an important contingency: inter-
local market externalities.  This Part argues that local governments should 
be held accountable for the market externalities that their zoning decisions 
generate on other localities, whenever such effects contradict the broad-
based policy that the city embraces to control its own intra-local market 
externalities. 
A. Consistency with Overall Land Use Policy 
Previous Parts laid the foundation for identifying market externalities 
resulting from land use and explained how zoning and other regulatory 
decisions could account for dimensions of aggregate welfare, distribution, 
and second-hand off-site technological or fiscal externalities embedded in 
market externalities.249  While there may be room for debate about the 
analysis of potential market externalities and the respective conclusions in 
contexts such as the entry of commercial uses, renting out of investment 
property, or inclusionary zoning, the control of market externalities should 
be explicitly recognized as a legitimate basis for zoning power. 
At the same time, the need to tie the level of judicial review to the breadth 
and scope of the local-land use policy plays a prominent role in the context 
of market externalities.  The distinction between legislative or broad-based 
policy and ad hoc or adjudicative decision making goes beyond 
considerations of rule of law, democratic accountability, and the need for 
occasional flexibility that regularly implicate land use law and policy.250  The 
need to have a citywide, or at least an industry-wide, analysis prior to 
regulation touches on the very foundations of identifying the existence of a 
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market externality and of normatively justifying the control over such 
potential effects through zoning rules. 
From an economic perspective, a market externality is a process in which 
a certain market-equilibrium undergoes a change through the price 
system.251  As such, it conventionally implicates numerous parties on both 
the supply and demand sides.  This is the case when one examines the effects 
of a new commercial project on other businesses and consumers, the price 
effects of investment properties on the rental or sales market, or the influence 
of new residential market-rate projects on the local job market and 
consequently on the entry of low- and modest-income workers in need of 
housing.252 
This means that in most cases, a single development will not generate any 
type of market externality, but it might contribute to such a change in 
conjunction with other contemporaneous projects, resulting in a critical mass 
that creates a new equilibrium.253  When this is the case, identifying a market 
externality or designing an adequate regulatory response (whether through a 
limit on land use, quota setting, or a fee system) needs to be completed within 
a broader picture of the changing landscape of the city. 
Indeed, there may be cases in which a single development could generate 
a market externality.  This would be so especially in the case of a big-box 
retailer, such as a Wal-Mart.254  Here too, however, a market analysis would 
require a broad analysis of the entire array of affected businesses and, more 
generally, of the policy choice between downtown business districts and 
spread-out retailers.255  An economic analysis based on agglomeration 
effects, or even on distributive concerns, would make little sense without a 
general policy on retail.  These settings are therefore materially different 
from purely anticompetitive motives, such as when a single grocery store 
objects to a variance to set up a new grocery store on the other side of the 
street—with no discernible broader effects.256 
From a legal perspective, the generation of a market externality should be 
considered blameless conduct, with no clear division between wrongdoer 
and victim.  This is unlike some cases of environmental externalities, in 
which the normative basis of regulation lies in identifying a party who 
creates a conflict (even if such an action is not proscribed as a nuisance or 
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another private law wrong)257 or a fiscal externality, in which new public 
expenses must be incurred.258  As a matter of policy, individuals and firms 
should be encouraged to act in the market, promote competition and 
innovation, and otherwise stimulate the economy.259  There are cases in 
which considerations of agglomeration effects, distribution, or the possibility 
of second-hand externalities may justify the regulation of land uses intended 
for such an activity.260  However, these limits are not based on an initial 
normative judgment about the wrongful nature of the activity. 
In contrast, no individual party can be viewed as legally entitled to block 
such an economic activity because this would infringe a legally recognized 
right or immunity from a change to the status quo.261  A retailer has no vested 
right not to have competition around it or to be compensated for such 
competition.  A homeowner has no individual entitlement to prevent others 
from investing in real estate in her neighborhood.  A low-income employee 
has no direct cause of action, or even a principled normative claim, against 
a market-rate household that generates demand for her services.  In all of 
these cases, the justification for regulation lies in a general evaluation of the 
effects of a change to the market-equilibrium.  As such, its legal validation 
must be based on a broad policy.  These observations do not preclude the 
possibility that in some cases, the regulation of a market externality must go 
beyond fixed formulas to provide a proper solution.  The physical location 
of a big-box store, the type of products it is selling, and the composition of 
preexisting businesses may change across different scenarios, and would 
accordingly affect the identification of the market externality and the 
measures of control.262  This type of required flexibility should not be 
equated, however, with ad hoc decision making, which attempts both to 
identify the problem and to cure it solely on a case-specific basis.263 
Conversely, in the case of technological or environmental or fiscal 
externalities, there could be cases in which an ad hoc analysis would be 
problematic, but, at the least, it would be based on some initial normative 
baseline that identifies the cause of the externality and its anticipated 
consequences.264  The Nollan/Dolan framework, which requires localities 
that make ad hoc land use decisions to illustrate an “essential nexus” and 
“rough proportionality” between the development and its adverse 
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consequences,265 inherently assumes that such an analysis of the cause and 
the cure can be made on an individual basis.  In the case of a market 
externality, this assumption does not work.  When a market externality is 
concerned, the “substantial relation” or “reasonable relationship” tests, while 
generally more lenient, may prove the only feasible way for courts to address 
the legal validity of zoning mechanisms intended to address market 
externalities.266  Such a legal standard provides relief to the local government 
by releasing it from having to identify a market externality that can be 
attributed to a specific project.  At the same time, this standard also places a 
burden of persuasion on the local government.  The city must demonstrate 
that the zoning rationale conforms to its broad policy and would be applied 
elsewhere in the city. 
Finally, one should consider the role of zoning decisions, and the legal 
standard that should apply to their review, when such decisions seek to focus 
on the generation of positive market externalities, rather than merely on 
preventing or mitigating negative market externalities resulting from new 
development. 
The discussion of positive market externalities requires even more 
differentiation between private law entitlements and the legitimacy of land 
use regulation than is the case with adverse market externalities.  The law of 
restitution usually does not entitle a benefactor to require payment or another 
kind of compensation from beneficiaries-in-fact, including when a developer 
carries out a project that provides unsolicited positive externalities.267  A 
neighbor cannot be held liable for a self-serving activity by another 
landowner that incidentally improves the neighbor’s land, even when the 
monetary value of the benefit is easily measured.268  This principle also 
applies when the benefit stems directly from a specific land use regulation, 
such as when a developer is required, as a condition for approving her 
subdivision map, to construct an additional road, which ensures that a 
neighboring landlocked property would gain access to the nearest 
thoroughfare.269 
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The reasons for private law’s reluctance to require beneficiaries to 
contribute to the internalization of positive externalities lie in considerations 
of autonomy and preference for pre-activity agreements, especially if the 
activity is sufficiently profitable for its doer, so that the “free riding” by the 
beneficiary will not undermine the activity altogether.270  Authors have also 
pointed to other dimensions of asymmetry between benefits and harms, 
including the nature of scope of the potential effects in the absence of private 
law rules.271 
Yet, regardless of the arguments against restitution in the private law 
context, zoning and other types of land use regulation are entitled to take into 
account the positive externalities that a proposed project may entail and 
should aim at maximizing such social benefits in order to promote the local 
“general welfare.”272 
Consider the following hypothetical.  A city wants to introduce more retail 
activity within its jurisdiction.  For this purpose, the city considers rezoning 
for commercial use one of two agricultural or currently undeveloped areas 
located in different parts of the city.  After a careful study, it concludes that, 
all other things being equal, rezoning Area A would generate more positive 
market externalities for adjacent businesses and households, as compared 
with Area B, because of geographic and other considerations.  Assume 
further that the city concludes that rezoning both areas simultaneously would 
result in excess commercial development, which could end in a massive 
closing down of businesses.  A decision to approve the rezoning of Area A, 
based on the analysis of such positive market externalities, should be 
considered legally valid.   This would be so even if such a decision stands to 
benefit the current landowners of Area A over those of Area B, provided that 
retail developers could purchase land in Area A.    
The more difficult issue is how to balance positive market externalities 
with the developer’s self-interests, if these two components are not perfectly 
aligned.  The municipality may have to offer developer incentives to ensure 
optimal land use.  Consider again the city’s hypothetical case.  Assume now 
that the same developer owns both Area A and Area B in their entirety.  The 
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developer would actually prefer to develop Area B, because it is 
geographically closer than Area A to the seaport through which the 
developer imports its retail products, meaning that the developer would save 
on transportation costs if Area B is developed.  Assume further that the sum 
of the developer’s savings on transportation costs in Area B is smaller than 
the difference in positive market externalities in favor of Area A.  However, 
because the developer cannot internalize the positive market externalities it 
is generating (assume that such externalities are not reciprocal), it will prefer 
to rezone Area B over Area A.  What the city could do in such a case is to 
offer the developer a density bonus for developing Area A. 
This decision should be anchored in a broad policy, by which the city 
incentivizes developers that generate positive market externalities.  If the 
societal costs, including environmental costs resulting from increased 
density, do not outweigh the overall benefits from rezoning Area A over 
Area B, such a zoning decision should be considered both economically 
sensible and legally valid.  Localities should accordingly extend explicit 
considerations of market externalities to facilitate positive externalities, 
instead of just controlling against negative ones. 
B. Intergovernmental Market Externalities 
The analysis so far assumes that both positive and negative market 
externalities fall within the boundaries of a single local government, which 
can then act to control or facilitate them through its power to regulate land 
use.  In reality, however, all types of land use related externalities may, and 
often do, spill over across municipal boundaries.273 
This could be the case with technological or environmental externalities, 
such as when a zoning decision enables the construction of a factory in City 
A that results in pollution that reaches City B.274  Fiscal externalities may 
also cross municipal borders.  For example, a busy commercial hub located 
in the outskirts of City A could increase congestion in nearby transportation 
arteries located in City B, requiring the latter to undertake public 
expenditures.275  Social externalities may also cross municipal borders, such 
as when exclusionary zoning practices of wealthy suburbs pass the burden 
of accommodating low- and modest-income families to the nearby central 
city.276 
Market externalities are no exception.  Rezoning land for a big-box 
retailer located in City A might positively or negatively affect the market 
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performance not only of existing businesses in the CBD of City A but also 
that of adjacent businesses located in City B.277   Similarly, the abundance 
of investment properties in one city may affect market prices in another 
municipality, when the two localities are part of the same metropolitan area, 
meaning that prospective homebuyers and renters view them as a single real-
estate market.278  Finally, the entry of new market-rate residential projects 
and their residents’ resulting demand for low-compensated service workers 
may affect housing needs and potential affordability gaps in all the 
municipalities located within commuting distance to these workplaces.279 
The analysis of the challenge of inter-local market externalities is based 
on the following principles.  First, it identifies why political and fiscal 
considerations operate differently for zoning decisions entailing intra-local 
externalities than those that generate inter-local effects.  Second, it explains 
the normative foundations of limiting cities in generating foreseeable inter-
local externalities when such decisions contradict their established policy for 
controlling against intra-local externalities.  Third, it offers preliminary 
thoughts on potential mechanisms for facilitating positive intergovernmental 
market externalities. 
When the negative and positive market externalities of a proposed 
development are concentrated in a single jurisdiction, political and fiscal 
reasons may drive the municipality to account for such externalities.280  A 
spread-out big-box development project entailing significant adverse 
externalities for existing businesses in the CBD might result in political 
discontent by local business owners, their employees, and those who 
otherwise value a thriving CBD.  While the balance of political influence 
changes across projects, there is some sense of political accountability in 
such settings.281  From a fiscal perspective, market externalities might result 
in lower property taxes—or even in an effective loss thereof in the case of 
foreclosure or long-lasting vacancies—or in a drop in sales tax revenues 
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when CBD businesses experience a decrease in proceeds.282  This makes 
local governments internalize some of the adverse market externalities and 
generally motivates them to consider, upfront, the overall effects of a 
proposed project. 
In contrast, when adverse market externalities fall outside the boundaries 
of the local government, there are no obvious incentives to consider their 
political and fiscal implications.  Affected parties do not vote in the local 
elections, and the fiscal losses resulting from decreased property tax or sales 
tax revenues fall on other municipalities.283  Notwithstanding the general 
model of long-term relationships among neighboring local governments, the 
problem of apathy to cross-border externalities is a documented phenomenon 
and is often exacerbated by an open contest for tax-yielding businesses.284  
In the latter case, apathy may turn into an intention to shift market activity 
across borders.285 
To illustrate this problem, consider a 2004 amendment to the California 
Government Code, which forbids local governments to provide “any form of 
financial assistance to a vehicle dealer or big box retailer . . . that is 
relocating from the territorial jurisdiction of one local agency to the 
territorial jurisdiction of another local agency but within the same market 
area.”286  This legislation, while controversial,287 clearly intends to limit 
intergovernmental market externalities by prohibiting neighboring agencies 
from luring developments. 
This phenomenon is not limited to retail land uses: cities in California’s 
Bay Area compete for big office complexes and use zoning to turn 
underutilized land uses into corporate offices.288  Apple’s new headquarters 
in Cupertino is a prominent example.289  Recent empirical evidence shows 
that local governments are well aware of the nature and scope of market 
externalities and may consequently design their land uses to maximize 
positive externalities within their jurisdiction and to shift bad ones 
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elsewhere.290  For example, as Shoag and Veuger show, the precise physical 
shape of municipal borders matters for capturing the positive market 
externalities of big-box stores.291  “Compact” cities, such as a city shaped 
like a perfect circle, can capture nearly all the benefits of a big-box store 
placed in the middle.  In contrast, non-compact cities, such as an “L” shaped-
one, do not enjoy the same result, with much of the positive effects instead 
crossing their borders.292  Accordingly, compact cities focus more on retail 
development, including through subsidies, than non-compact ones.293  Cities 
consciously respond, therefore, to the inter-local dimensions of market 
externalities. 
Should local governments ever be liable to adjacent municipalities for 
adverse market externalities?  If so, what could be the basis for legal recourse 
against local governments for market externalities that can be attributed to 
zoning or other regulatory decisions?  As shown above,294 private law is not 
the appropriate means for addressing intra-local market externalities, and is 
similarly poorly suited to address inter-local market externalities.  A 
developer’s decision to set up a new business and, correspondingly, a city’s 
decision to approve the required zoning cannot be viewed as constituting a 
legal wrong because the increased competition will inflict losses on current 
businesses.295  An existing business should not be viewed as having an 
enforceable right or a principled normative claim for preserving the 
economic status-quo under such circumstances.296  Awarding such a private 
entitlement could inadvertently lead to private litigation between two 
competitors, who will miss out on the broader view of the multi-party 
market-equilibrium effects.297  The justification for controlling against 
potential market externalities lies in the local government’s ability to shape 
a broad-based policy regarding the various aspects of market effects, and it 
should be held responsible for properly administering this policy.298 
The appropriate entities to contest zoning measures that generate extra-
local market externalities are adjacent local governments rather than private 
individuals or businesses located within them.299  A neighboring local 
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government is the body that can attest to, or at least claim to identify, the 
overall market externalities (positive and negative) within its boundaries.300  
Adjacent municipalities are better situated to assess the overall change in 
market-equilibrium and to act upon it. 
One possibility is to introduce an “intergovernmental liability rule” 
regime301 through which local governments could be held liable to adjacent 
municipalities for fiscal losses that the latter incurred in decreased property 
taxes and other revenues because of a land use decision with adverse 
extraterritorial effects.  Focusing on these public entities and public revenues 
as the basis for compensation would keep intact the normative separation 
between private law entitlements and the collective implications of 
government regulation, with such payments serving as a proxy for societal 
welfare.302 
Another suggestion, in the context of inter-local market externalities, is a 
more modest one.  Judicial review of zoning decisions should hold the local 
government accountable for the potential threat of “regulatory 
opportunism,”303 by which a certain municipality seeks to shoulder a specific 
negative market externality onto the residents of adjacent localities.304 
The criteria for holding a municipality responsible for inter-local market 
externalities, generated by its zoning decision, should be based primarily on 
the consistency of such effects with the policy adopted by the municipality 
to regulate its intra-local externalities.  For example, if City A explicitly 
adopts a policy that considers the effects of big-box retailers on the economic 
viability of small retailers in the CBD and, accordingly, allows big-box 
developments only beyond a certain radius—e.g., two miles from its own 
CBD—it should be scrutinized for rezoning a tract located only one mile 
from the CBD of City B.  Even if no such explicit statement by City A exists 
on the record, City B should be able to otherwise demonstrate the existence 
of such a policy.  City B can do so by pointing to previous zoning decisions 
or to the differential effects of the current one, passing the onus to City A to 
show that it would have made the same zoning decision had the entire array 
of market externalities remained within its boundaries.  City A would thus 
have to show that its broad-based policy, under which it exercises its power 
to regulate market externalities, is furthered by the challenged decision and 
that the decision bears a reasonable relation to the broader policy. 
                                                                                                                                      
 300. Id. 
 301. Id. 
 302. Id. 
 303. Cf. Thomas P. Lyon & John W. Mayo, Regulatory Opportunism and Investment 
Behavior:  Evidence from the U.S. Electric Utility Industry, 36 RAND J. ECON. 628 (2005). 
 304. Lehavi, supra note 9, at 962-77. 
2017] ZONING & MARKET EXTERNALITIES 409 
This standard of review also sheds light on the potential legal implications 
of positive intergovernmental market externalities.  A local government is 
not legally required to confer positive market externalities on adjacent 
municipalities.305  As long as the current political system of local 
governments (rather than regional ones) remains intact,306 with the power of 
zoning vested in them under the SZEA or other state law, a city is not 
required to share the benefits of positive market externalities with other cities 
if its neighbors cannot prove the existence of cross-border negative 
effects.307 
Accordingly, the conferral of positive market externalities should be 
primarily the result of pre-zoning negotiations between the respective local 
governments, with adjacent localities potentially offering incentives or other 
goods to the municipality in which the project is located, so that the project 
would be designed to provide cross-border benefits.  These could be similar 
to the incentives a local government offers developers to maximize intra-
local positive externalities.308 
CONCLUSION 
The centennial of the 1916 New York City Ordinance and creation of 
zoning in the United States provides an exceptional opportunity to reconsider 
the regulatory and legal basis upon which this key governmental power is 
founded.  The motive to control the various market externalities embedded 
in land use regulation, from effects on commercial activity, to housing prices 
and job-related housing needs, has practically guided local governments 
from the very first days of zoning.  Yet, at the same time, such considerations 
of market externalities remain in the shadows of explicit zoning law and 
policy, as the discussion is re-routed to the allegedly more stable foundations 
of zoning, such as control of technological or environmental, fiscal, or social 
externalities.  This reality must change. 
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Beyond identifying the regulatory and legal principles for the use of the 
zoning power to control against market externalities, the analysis in this 
Article sheds new light on the interplay between legislative or broad-based 
policy and ad hoc or adjudicative decision making in land use regulation.  
Market externalities exemplify how legislative or broad-based decision 
making is essential to both identify externalities and devise regulatory 
solutions to them.  From an economic perspective, a market externality is a 
process in which a certain market-equilibrium undergoes a change through 
the price system, implicating numerous parties on both the supply and 
demand sides.  There is no economic justification to narrowly identifying a 
market externality, or in designing a response, without a broader picture of 
the changing economic landscape of the city. 
From a legal perspective, out of all the types of land use related 
externalities, the generation of market externalities tends to be reciprocal and 
blameless in nature.  This means that the legal validation of measures to 
control such externalities must be based on a credible, broad policy that does 
not solely rely on ad hoc normative judgment.  When a market externality is 
concerned, a substantial relation or reasonable relationship may prove the 
only feasible way for courts to address the legal validity of broad-based, 
legislative zoning mechanisms intended to address the spectrum of market 
externalities. 
The innovative framework developed in this Article provides a way to 
close the long-existing gap between economics and law in the study of 
zoning and externalities.  These normative principles offer a promising start 
for the upcoming century of land use regulation, as American society deals 
with the increasing challenges of its cities. 
